Past -Some Reminiscences
One of the most productive days in my life was the day in 1956 when it was agreed that Merton Miller-then a shy and retiring young man (would you believe it!)-would sit in my graduate course in "Money and Macroeconomics" at Carnegie Institute of Technology. It was an exciting course with excellent students. It took a broad view of the subject. One issue that was covered was the cost of capital as a determinant of the rate of investment. I had been intrigued by the subject ever since attending a National Bureau conference on Business Finance at which I gave a (fairly conventional) paper (Modigliani and Ziman, 1952) . But mostly I listened to a paper by David Durand (1952) in which the possibility that financial structure would not affect the market valuation or the cost of capital was suggested, only to be rejected as not relevant to the actual capital markets.
In preparing my lecture dealing with the cost of capital, I was able to provide (for a world of no taxes) a sort of proof of Proposition I, based on arbitrage. I reported the result to my class the next day, adding that I didn't really believe my result and there probably was something wrong. But Miller was instantly captured by the result because, he said, he knew of a recent paper (Allen, 1954) which provided empirical support for the result, even though it lacked a convincing rationale. We thus formed, there and then, the M M alliance, pledged to go to the bottom of the issue. Except for the fortuitous presence of Miller in this class and his immediate appreciation for the importance of this issue, the M M proposition (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) might never have seen the light. As explained by Miller, the second paper on dividend policy (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) was a derivative of the first, initially spurred by the intention of completing and refining our proof.
The M M paper is unquestionably the most popular of my writings, primarily because it has been, and continues to be, required reading for many graduate business schools. The way it is used in master's programs, as far as I can ascertain, is as a whipping boy-the instructor assigns the paper for reading and then has a feast tearing it to shreds. Wherever I have gone I have found former MBA students recognizing my name and quickly relating it to their M M days. But I have discovered that M M is particularly popular among Washington's young taxi drivers, since an extraordinarily large portion of them seem to be African students going to graduate business schools. Whenever I take a taxi in Washington and find that it is driven by a young man with an accent, I try to bring the subject around to M M and the almost universal result is instant kinship, together with a complaint-one that is actually fairly universal among former MBA students-that the article is much too difficult, though I suspect that they enjoy talking about the article just because it was so difficult (cognitive dissonance!). I am told its essence could have been restated in a more comprehensible fashion.
I have always been ready to apologize for causing trouble, and have offered explanations in our defense. Surely now that the M M theorem seems almost trivial, one could easily present a proof in a more readily intelligible fashion. But not then, when colleagues (academic and practitioner) took it as self-evident that there was a unique, value-maximizing debt ratio and regarded our propositions as plainly preposterous. There was therefore a need for rigorous and varied arguments to show the formal proof of the result and provide the "new" intuition as to why it made sense. Thus the article had never been meant as an expository paper for master's students in business. It was addressed to finance specialists and it was written tongue-in-cheek, not really to demonstrate that leverage could not possibly affect market values in the actual world but to shock those who accepted the then-current naive view that some debt in the capital structure had to reduce the cost of capital even in the absence of taxes simply because the interest rate was lower than the earnings-price ratio on equity.
Present and Future
Miller has reviewed, in his usual masterly fashion, the validity and working of the M M theorem under conditions of perfect market and no taxes. There seems little to add to that subject, especially since, by now, countless alternative proofs of the theorem have been provided. So I would like to come back to some issues that are still with us-and probably will be for a long time. How should the M M propositions be modified in the presence of taxes and how well do they perform in accounting for observed behavior? For convenience I shall refer to the original Modigliani-Miller paper (1958) as MM; to the correction paper (1963) as MMC; to Miller's "Debt and Taxes" paper (1977) as MI; and finally to my own paper on the subject (Modigliani, 1982) as MO.
The Tax Effect of Leverage
In the MMC paper, after rejecting our conclusions in MM about the effect of taxes as a false start, we proceeded to present a corrected set of conclusions, confident that they represented the final word. According to the new conclusions, the value of leverage increased a great deal: a dollar of debt was supposed to increase value by r,, the marginal corporate profit tax rate (labeled T in MMC, equation 3). By constrast, in M M the increase in value was put at (r/p)r, (see MMC, equation 4), where r is the riskless interest rate and p the capitalization rate for the relevant "risk class." For the postwar period r/p seems to have been on the order of 1/3.
As I have tried to establish in MO (1982) , there are at least two things that are wrong in MMC: (1) we made an unjustifiable assumption concerning the appropriate rate for discounting the flow of tax saving produced by the debt; and (2) we proceeded as though firms were to be valued on the basis of the total stream of net of tax income they generated (dividends plus retained earnings plus interest). This is clearly wrong when there are personal taxes, for then what matters is the total return net of personal as well as corporate taxes and in general, the personal taxes paid depend on the composition of the income generated by the corporation.
Consider first the question of the appropriate capitalization rate for the tax saving from leverage. In MM, after establishing the MM theorem-the independence of market value from leverage in the absence of taxes-we went on to assert (p. 14), "it can be shown that the market value of firms . . . must be proportional in equilibrium to their expected return net of taxesn-though proof of this proposition was not actually offered.
The anticipated return net of taxes, Xr, is the sum of stockholders return net of taxes and interest paid. It can be written as (cf. MM, equation 1) here 2 is the expected return before taxes and interest, and Z is a drawing from a distribution having unit expectation. MM asserted that the value of the firm should be proportional to be expected return, with the proportionality factor given by the capitalization rate p appropriate to a risky stream in the given risk class. Thus, the value of an unlevered firm V, and of a levered firm VL(cf. MM, equation 4) can be expressed as Thus a dollar of debt would increase the value of the firm by r,(r/p).
In MMC we rejected this result on the ground that the stream of annual tax saving r,rD, in contrast to the profit stream (1 -r , ) h was "a sure stream" (MMC, p. 435); therefore it should be capitalized not at p but at the sure rate r. In that case, the last term of (3) becomes (~,rD)/r = T,D, (cf. MMC equation 3) which is the basic contribution of MMC. With the corporate rate nearly 50 percent at the time of our writing, a dollar of debt would raise the market value of the firm by roughly 50 cents. But this result rests on the assumption that the tax saving stream 7,rD is constant, perpetual, and absolutely certain like the coupon of a government bond. In MMC we did mention some limitations to the validity of the assumption, on account of the possibility of changes in the tax code as well as of profits falling below contractual interest. But the much more fundamental objection relates to the assumption that leverage policy can be modeled as the choice of an amount of debt in the capital structure, fixed once and for all. This assumption seems untenable in a world in which the movement of expected profit and size of the firm is widely supposed to follow something like a random walk (or a martingale). It seems much more reasonable to suppose that the leverage policy of the representative firm can be described as aiming at maintaining the debt in a stable relation to the scale of the firm as seen at any given date. If, for example, the appropriate scale variable is approximated by the net of tax cash flow of the (unlevered) firm (or equivalently by market value of the firm V,), we can write where d embodies the firm's debt policy, and the superscript -on D is to remind us that future debt, like future profit, is a random variable. Under these conditions total after-tax return of the levered firm Xr, given by (I), can be restated as:
The essential difference with equation (1) above is that according to (5), the return of the levered firm can be seen as proportional to that of the unlevered firm, (1 -~, ) X Z , the proportionality factor being (1 + r,rd). This proportionality of returns in turn implies that the market value of the levered firm VL must also be proportional to that of the unlevered firm, V,, given by equation (2), with the same proportionality factor.
or using (4), According to (7) the value of tax saving comes to (r/p)rcD which is much smaller than MMC's r,D. In fact, for the postwar period, it is only about 1/3 as large.
One particularly intriguing implication of (7) is that the value of leverage it implies is the same as that implied by the original M M (see equation (3) above). In other words, if one accepts the reasonable notion that the appropriate discount rate for r,rD is p rather than r, then the correction paper and its "definitive" corrections need never have been written: Personal taxation aside, the definitive truth was all in M M (though the original way of establishing the result was defective). Of course this is somewhat of an exaggeration since it would be foolhardy to claim that p is the appropriate way to discount the tax saving under all circumstances and tax regimes (for example, independently of loss carryover and loss salability provisions). In particular, a number of considerations suggest that the tax saving might be even riskier than the basic cash flow, because of possible changes in interest rates, leverage policy, taxation, and so on. Perhaps if we had been very wise we should have presented the basic valuation formula in a form more general than either MMC or the proposed alternative given by (7) (and the original MM), namely as Here x denotes the reciprocal of the discount rate to be applied to rcrD, which could range from r to p or even higher. Note that (8) retains the M M assumption that the gain from leverage is proportional to D. This may not be strictly true when we take account of bankruptcy cost, and the probability that taxable profits (as reduced by investment tax credit and other factors) may fall short of interest. As a result, V!, might increase with D but at a decreasing rate, at least beyond some point.
But even if M M was more nearly correct than MMC in the treatment of tax saving, it did contain a second error as suggested earlier-namely, neglecting the role of differential personal taxation of the different sources of return produced by a corporation. Clearly, the value of leverage to investors must depend on the amount of additional taxes, corporate and personal, that could be avoided by paying out an additional dollar of corporate returns in the form of interest (which is subject to the personal income tax) while reducing by a dollar stockholders profits (which are subject to the corporate plus the appropriate personal income taxes).
There is presumably broad agreement ever since the Farrar, Selwyn contribution (1967) that under the U.S. system of taxation, what leverage adds to the investor's stream of returns net of both corporate and personal taxes can be written as the second term of (8) The common sense of (9) is that if a dollar of profit is received as return on equity, and assuming that none is paid out in the form of dividends, then the tax that will be paid is first the corporate tax 7, and then the capital gains tax 7 , leaving (1 -rc)(l -7,). On the other hand, a dollar of interest will be taxed only at the personal level, leaving (1 -r p ) In the limiting case when there are no personal taxes or, more generally, capital gains are taxed like all other personal income, that is, rg = rp, it can be seen that 1 reduces to MM's r, because it makes no difference in what form corporate earnings are paid out-leverage is valuable only because it saves corporate income taxes. Thus we are back to the M M results. However, if r, < rp, then 1 < 7, and could even be zero if, for example, r, were zero and rp = 7,.
However, despite the agreement about I, there is room for disagreement as to what it implies for the market valuation of levered stock. Miller (and others) interpret his above-mentioned equation as indicating what a particular investor would stand to gain or lose from corporate versus personal leverage, given his specific marginal tax rates. He then relies on the notion that the equilibrium market valuation must be determined by the marginal holder and on the existence of tax-exempt securities to conclude that the marginal holders, who determine the market value of I, may (and will tend to) be characterized by a set of individual marginal tax parameters such that rp = 7,. Combined with the assumption that 7 , is small, this condition, as we have just shown, implies that the market value of leverage, 1, is close to zero. In equilibrium leverage is, taxwise, basically worthless.
In my own analysis, inspired by a number of earlier contributions (Brennan, 1970; Elton and Gruber, 1974; Auerbach and King, 1982) I have relied on the mean-variance framework and shown that, because of the benefits of portfolio diversification, it implies that every investor will, in principle, be led to hold a position (possibly negative) in a wide variety of stocks (in principle all), albeit the stocks will be held in different combinations reflecting tax parameters as well as risk preferences. Under these conditions, it turns out that in (8) above, r, is still replaced by I, but 1 is evaluated using not the parameters of the marginal holders as in Miller, but rather an average of all relevant marginal tax rates (since basically everyone is holding all the stocks) but weighted by both tax parameters and risk aversion, which contribute to determine individual holdings.
Since up to the latest tax reform the average capital gain tax was much smaller than the average personal tax rate, my approach implies that I is substantially positive, though well below 7,. In M O it was estimated that, for the postwar years up to 1988, the coefficient I-computed from estimated average tax rates-could be placed around 0.33. Accordingly, the value of tax saving could be estimated at 0.33 if the saving were capitalized at the sure rate, but only at 0.11 if capitalized at the more relevant risky rate. This last estimate implies that a 10 percent rise in leverage would increase market valuation by just over one percent (instead of some 4 percent if tax savings are capitalized at the sure rate). Obviously this effect is small enough to suggest that, up to the Tax Reform Act (TRA), leverage policy decisions must have been largely swayed by considerations other than tax saving. Note that this conclusion is not very different from that reached by Miller in MI, but it is based on an entirely different reasoning which has quite different implications with respect to the effect of changes in tax laws, such as the most recent one.
One salient nature of this revision is that all sources of income from the corporation-capital gains, interest, dividends-are taxed basically in the same way. Only the capital gains tax remains marginally lower because of the possibility of postponing realization (and the postponement may be quite long under the so-called death loophole). Therefore, to a first approximation, we are back in the regime implicitly assumed in both MM and MMC for which I is approximately 7,. Note that this conclusion holds whether one accepts Miller's formulation relying on marginal taxes or ours, based on average tax rate, since 1 = T , for every individual (including tax exempt institutions), and 7, is of course the same for all, namely 0.34, under the new law.
Miller seems to view this feature of new tax law with alarm for it changes his value of 1 very significantly: from zero, or close to, in the old regime, to 7, or 0.34, under the new tax system. He thinks that corporations might engage in an extensive search for types of organizations other than the standard corporate form in response to the loss of favorable tax treatment of capital gains due to retained earnings. He further suggests that they might respond to the opportunity to reduce taxes through leverage, by "gut[ting] the corporate tax with high leverage capital structure." He even suggests that the Tax Reform Act may provide a unique opportunity to test these expectations.
However, according to my analysis, the effects of TRA on leverage should be negligible. The reason is that though Miller and I agree that under the new regime I = 7, = 0.34, it happens that in the old regime, my estimate of I is very nearly the same number, namely, 1/3 (see above). This is the result of the fact that, although 7, was close to 0.5, my estimate of I, based on average tax rates, was appreciably lower than I. If the tax gains are capitalized at the risky rate, then both the above figures should be divided by 3. Clearly, there is essentially no change in the value of leverage on account of TRA, and therefore, according to my analysis, no reason to expect any changes in leverage policy. There continues to be an advantage to leverage, though rather small.
With such sharp differences in implications, perhaps the next few years may serve as a crucial experiment. But I don't really expect that we will be so lucky as to witness the experiment. No doubt there will be numerous interferences from exogenous shocks, such as further changes in tax laws, or changes in incentives to leverage other than income taxes, not to mention the possibility of inconclusive results.
The Tax Effects of Dividend Policy
We can readily establish that, at least under the M M (1961) assumption that investment policy is independent of dividend policy, a company paying A dollars of dividends will increase the flow of taxes and reduce the net of tax stream received by the public by ( T-r,)A-at least as long as the alternative to paying dividends is to buy back equity. The effect on the value of a corporation can then be assessed by capitalizing the stream of tax losses. If we are prepared to assume that the current dividend A will be paid forever and with complete certainty, then it would be appropriate to capitalize the tax loss at the sure rate r, following the procedure used by MM in capitalizing the stream of tax saving 7,rD. The contribution to value from dividends would then come to (7, -T~)A/T, implying a very large negative effect-something like a reduction in market value of $8.00 per dollar of dividend, or a decline in value of the order of 8 percent for a 10 percent increase in payout ratio.
But again, there seems to be absolutely no justification for the assumption that incremental tax dollars due to the current dividend will continue forever and with as much certainty as if they represented the interest on a government bond-barring limiting cases where the income itself is certain. How can the dividends be more certain than the stochastic income out of which they are generated? This suggests as one possible reasonable alternative that what the market should value is dividend policy, defined, say, as the long run pay-out ratio or as the proportion 6 of (long run) tax corrected expected profits to be paid out in dividends. (It may be argued that many companies have a short-run policy of stabilizing dividends rather than the payout rate. But this is because payout policies typically call for dividends proportional to smoothed income which is, clearly, not inconsistent with our hypothesis of long-run proportionality of dividends and income.) Under the above hypothesis, the expected flow of dividend induced by the policy becomes a stochastic variable: which presumably should be capitalized at the risky rate p just like the tax saving from leverage. Accordingly, the loss in value becomes [(rp -7,)6X(1 -~, )]/p. This implies that a 10 percent change in the payout 6 would reduce market value by less than 3 percent. Needless to say, using p as the discount rate seems plausible (a lot more than using r), but alternative formulations could no doubt be defended. Thus, the risk in the tax stream arising from dividends might be greater than for profits because of possible changes in dividend policies (which our analysis suggests should therefore be avoided) or in the tax treatment of capital gains versus ordinary income, of which we have just had a conspicuous example.
If our formulation is reasonably close to truth, then it would suggest that the impact of dividend policy on value by way of tax effect could again easily be swamped by other factors, such as the lack of investment opportunities plus restraint in buying back one's own share because of IRS disapproval or convention, or perhaps even signalling (despite some skepticism on my part).
These considerations bring us back once more to the implication of the grand experiment represented by the TRA. Under the new law, rp -r, will be zero except for the postponability of the tax on capital gains. Thus, the tax cost of paying dividends will have been whittled down to a negligible level, even if not actually to zero. Anyone taking the view that dividends, though quite costly under the old tax law, were nonetheless being extensively paid out (on the average not far from 50 percent of profits) must conclude that with the great reduction in the tax cost of dividends, brought about by the new tax law, there must be a substantial increase in dividend payout. In addition, one should expect other observables, like a rise in the price of firms which were paying large dividends in relation to low-paying firms.
O n the other hand, if I am right in holding that the cost of paying dividends was reasonably small under the old tax, then the effect of the new regime should be small at best. For the same reason there should be no significant realignment in the value of firms with different payouts. Here, too, in principle the TRA should provide an opportunity for a crucial experiment, though again I have doubts that the opportunity will be realized. The tax regime may not stay put long enough, and even if it does it may not be easy to interpret observed behavior of boards of directors and markets as unequivocally supporting one model or the other. For instance, little change, which in principle should be interpreted as support of my model, could simply reflect noise in the data, unobservable expectations, or even plain inertia.
And I must recognize in this connection that, ever since my work in analyzing the effects of inflation on market valuation (Modigliani and Cohn, 1979) , I have become a bit disenchanted with the indiscriminate use of superrationality as the foundation for models of financial behavior. In particular, I have come to the conclusion that the effects of inflation on valuation derive primarily from the market's failure to undersand how to value equities in the presence of significant inflation, which results in systematic, predictable error. I have supported this contention with evidence that this hypothesis can account for the depressed market of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the recovery until 1986, the bubble of 1986-87, and its recent unavoidable bursting (Modigliani 1979 (Modigliani , 1980 . I must finally acknowledge that there is one further reason for little short-run changes in dividends (or even leverage policy) which is consistent with alternative valuation models and rational behavior, namely a widely held belief by the public that equal taxation of capital gains and other personal income will just not last. In an era which, in a matter of a very few years, has witnessed the most remarkable sequence of "permanent" changes in business and personal income taxation, there is certainly ample rational grounds for not responding to the changes implied by the latest tax bill as though they were as perennial as the Rock of Gibraltar!
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